1. The unity of propositions problem

Propositions: objects that play certain roles:
- meanings of sentences,
- objects of attitudes, speechacts
- entities making up domain of propositional quantifiers, propositional anaphora
- what sentence operators operate on, what connectives apply to

General problems with propositions (Jubien 2001):

Representation problem 1:
propositions have inherent truth conditions, constituents of propositions have extensions that count for truth conditions
- why should a sequence be true or false?
- why should a component of a sequence have an extension, a referent?

Representation problem 2:
The unity of propositions problem:
Why should the relation between components of a structured proposition lead to a truthvalue true of false, given the contributions of the components?
Given the contributions of the components, the truthvalue of a proposition cannot be read off the relation among the components on its own.

Different view of the content of predicates
predicate meanings:
unsaturated entities, properties that are objects, functions
sets of tropes - predicational tropes (Mertz) and tropes acting as objects

Copula meaning:
- saturation
- function application
- instantiation, attribution of property
- attributing bearerhood to one of the tropes in the predicate denotation

2. The generality of the problem

Other cases beside predicate-subject relation:

Quantifiers – predicates: Everyone is happy: attributing ‘everyone’ to ‘happiness’

Complex properties- predicate modifiers: John is profoundly happy.

Connectives: John won the race or Mary won it.

Operators: Mary must be happy.

3. The intentionalist view of content and predication

3.1. The general problem of representations

Objects cannot represent something on their own; they must be intended to do so (possibly going along with convention).

Application to structured propositions:
- A structured proposition cannot represent truth on its own.
- Components of structured propositions cannot represent objects.
- Relation among proposition cannot on its own represent function-argument application, instantiation etc., but rather requires intentionality to do so

The case of sentences:
The conventions of grammar (syntax and semantics): make sure sentences used in assertions, thought, are intended with the representational properties as specified by grammar

Truth and intentionality:
Truth as the intention of symbolic acts
Predication as a truthdirected intentional ‘act’ (or relation)
Truth as the success of a truthdirected intentional ‘act’ (or particularized property)
A proposition <P, d> is true in context c because agent a successfully predicates P of d in c.
3.2. The (Neo)-Russellian analysis (Jubien 2001, Moltmann 2003)

Attitude verbs as multigrade predicates:

*Think* has two positions: one for an agent, one with an unlimited number of places for propositional constituents

(1) a. John thought that Mary is happy
    b. THINK(John; HAPPY, Mary)

(2) a. John thinks that Mary likes Bill.
    b. THINK(John; LIKE, Mary, Bill)

extensions:

connectives:

*or* as multigrade in each of its positions:

(3) a. [that S or S’] = ⟨or; C, ..., Cn; C’, ..., C’n⟩
    b. John thinks that Mary won or Sue won.
    c. THINK(John, OR, WON, Mary; WIN, Sue)

modals:

*must* as multigrade:

(4) a. John thinks that Sue must be happy
    b. THINK(John, MUST, HAPPY, Sue)

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Intentional acts and attitudinal objects

4.1. What are the truthbearers?

Also: what are the objects for ‘propositional’ anaphora, the domain of ‘propositional’ quantifiers?

Answer: attitudinal objects

examples: John’s thought that S, John’s desire to VP, John’s claim that S

attitudinal objects vs mental events / illocutionary acts:

truthconditions:

(5) a. John’s thought that S is true.
    b. # John’s (act of) thinking that S is true.

(6) a. John’s claim that S is true.
    b. # John’s (act of) claiming that S is true.
(7) a. John’s desire to become a king was satisfied.
   b. ?? John’s (state of) desiring of becoming a king was satisfied.
(8) a. John’s thought that S would be true even if he had not thought that.
   b. John’s claim that S would be true even if John had never claimed that.

similarity relations:
(9) a. John’s thought was the same as Mary’s.
   b. John’s claim / question was the same as Mary’s.
(10) a. # John’s thinking was the same as Mary’s.
     b. # John’s claiming / questioning was the same as Mary’s.

constituted by time:
(11) a. John’s thought might have occurred to him earlier than it did.
     b. ?? John’s thinking might have occurred earlier than it did.
(12) a. John could have asked this particular question of his yesterday already.
     b. ?? John might have been engaged in this particular questioning yesterday already.

4.2. properties of attitudinal objects
- dependent on ‘attitudinal mode’:
(13) a. *John’s thought S is also his remark that S.
     b. * John’s claim that it will rain is his hope that it will rain.
     c. ?? John’s desire to be a kind is also his request to become a king.
     d. * John’s imagination to be a kind is also his thought that he is a king.
(14) a. John’s thought that S is unusual.
     b. That S is unusual.
(15) a. John’s claim that S is astonishing.
     b. That S is astonishing.
- objects of perception, relata of causal relations:
(16) a. John heard Mary’s remark that S.
     b. John’s claim that S caused astonishment.

4.3. sharing of propositional content
exact similarity of attitudinal objects:
(17) a. John’s thought was the same as Mary’s.
     b. John claim was the same as Mary’s.

kinds of attitudinal objects:
(18) a. John and Mary share the thought that S
   b. The thought that S occurred to both John and Mary.
   c. The thought that S was both John’s and Mary’s.

‘kind behavior’:
(19) a. The thought that S is unusual.
   b. John has never encountered the claim that S.
   c. John needs the insight that S.
   d. The thought that S has never occurred to anyone.
   e. The belief that S is widespread.

4.4. Ontology of attitudinal objects

Truthconditions of attitudinal objects and truthconditions of sentences
(20) P gives the truth conditions of a sentence S expressing the sequence \(<C_1, ..., C_n>\)
    iff for any attitudinal object t, t = f(d; \(\lambda x[R(x, C_1, ..., C_n)]\)): t is true (satisfied) iff
    P(C_1, ..., C_n).

Attitudinal objects are not relational tropes:
(21) a. * John’s belief that Sue hates Milton is the same as John’s belief that Mary likes Bill.
   b. John’s belief is the same as Joe’s belief; they both believe that Mary likes Bill.

Quasi-relational tropes:
John’s thought that Mary is happy:
the instantiation (at whatever time) of the property \(\lambda x[\text{THINK}(x, \text{HAPPY}, \text{Mary})]\) in John.

Mental events, illocutionary acts:
Events in general as relational second-level tropes that are (composed of) transitions from one trope to another.

4.5. Attitudinal objects and kind of attitudinal objects and propositional quantifiers

(22) a. John said something Bill has never heard before.
   b. John said something that made Mary very upset.
(23) a. John said something nice (namely that S).
   b. John thought something very daring (namely that S).
c. John imagined something exciting.

(24) a. # John remembers what Mary believes, namely that Bill was elected president.
   b. # John hopes what Mary believes, namely that Sue will study harder.
   c. # John said what Mary believes, namely that it will rain.
   d. # John believes what Mary imagined, that she would be a princess.

(25) a. John has often suggested what Mary now claims, namely that Bill is a spy.
   b. John sometimes tended to believe what Mary is now convinced of, namely that Bill is a spy.
   c. John demanded what Mary was going to request, that the door be opened.

(26) a. John finally said what Mary has always believed.
   b. John said what Mary doubts, namely that the meeting would be fruitless.

5. Different kinds of predication

More general notions of predication than the multigrade relations expressed by attitude and speech act verbs:

Sharing of more general predication relation:
- believe, being convinced of
- demand, request

Most general intentional predication relation:
Kant ‘judgment’
Russell: ‘understanding’
Stalnaker: ‘acceptance’

Where is it needed?
- the proposition that S
- John’s belief is Mary’s claim that S, as well as constructions with propositional quantifiers
- That S is true

Most general attitudinal objects: the acceptance / judgment that Mary is happy

Arguably part of every attitudinal object
In what sense of part? Non-spatiotemporal part, as generally with events (the movement of the finger, triggering the shot, killing etc)
How are more complex attitudes built? – general answer from theory of events (tropes)